The vita Miltiadis of Cornelius Nepos.
By Stanley Casson.
The Singular inaclequacy of Herodotus to describe the events of the Persiaii Wars in au intelligible narrativc which would be at once free from the influeiice of taintcd sources and comprehonsible in itself, renders it most nocessary to tako into account any shreds of evidence derived from sources other than Iiis.
Cornelius Nepos in Iiis Lives of Distingnished Generals provides not a littlc of such independent evidence, which, whatever its origin, seems to be free from those preconceptions iraplicit in evidence gleaned by the Herodotean method of Xtyetv xa Itjoiieva. These lives of the Generals, long attributed to an otherwise unknown Aemilius Probus, were declared in 1569 by Dionysius Lambinus to be the work of Cornelius Nepos. A compromise between the rival views was ultimately reached in the decision arrived at that the actual existing text, HS edited by Lambinus, was an epitome by Probus of the more lengthy Originals by Nepos. Seeing that the text was used very extcnsively as a Standard school book, we might go so far as to say that Probus abridged and siniplified the longer versions with a vievv to using the work as a school book, rather than as a historical epitome.
But, whatever the truth about its authorship may be, this book of lives gives to the historian a unique collcction of fragraents of evidence bearing directly on the Persian Wars, and apparently derived, as will be shown later, from sources quite distinct from and in some ways superior to those of Herodotus 1).
The life of Miltiades seeais to contain the majority of such evidence and to be independent of all Herodotean Inspiration. Both as a biography and as literature it is poor and its narrative shows little of the charm of Plutarch or of the style of Herodotus. It is not even accnrate, for it confuses Miltiades the son of Kimon with his uncle Miltiades the son of 1) Macan, however, remarks that 'there is hardly a Single item to be found in Cornelius which can be treated as authoritative'. Appendix I. 14. An unbiassed estimate of Cornelius alone can show how far this is correct.
1
Lemnos-and it is in this accouiit oF the Lemnian expedition tliat we first meet with thc divcrgencc between the narratives oF Herodotus and Nepos, and the use by the latter of clearer documents and earlier historical traditions. On bis arrival at Lemnos, Miltiades demanded its surrender and allegiance to Athens; the Lomnians replied that they would submit only when he saüed fron: his home to Lemnos with a north wind. He, thereforo, left Lemnos and proceeded to the Chersonese, where he effected a temporary Organisation and settlement of his domains. Subsequently he returned to Lemnos and demanded the surrender of the island on tiie gound that the conditions previously made by the Lemnians had been fulfihed. as he had sailed on a northern wind from his home in the Chersonese. The Carians who tiien inhabited Lemnos, continues Nepos, submitted-resistere and non sant at(iiic ex instila dcmigrarnnt.
After this it appears that Miltiades captured other Islands for Athens-pari felidtate ceteras insulas quae Cycladcs nnnunantiir sitb Athenicnsium redegit ^lotcstatem, and we can See in this either a definito policy of fornring an outer line of defence against ['ersia as he seems to have intended in the later Parian expedition, or eise an Interpretation of a raid in the light of the later fifth Century when every expedition was for the purposc of subduing islands into the Athenian power').
Howcver this may be, Herodotus barely alludes to the expedition at all, and what he does say seems confnsed. The anecdote, or rather the folk-tale, of Lemnos about Miltiades and the wind from the north he attributes to the Pelasgians (Pelasgians and Carians alike were types of Aborigincs to Greek historians), and describes how it was uttered when, on thc occasion of the Pelasgian atrocities in early times^), Athens demanded the surrender of Lemnos. Tery many years afterwards', he says, 'Miltiades the son of Kimon came from Elaeum in the Chersonese on the Etesian winds and ordered the Pelasgians to leave thc island, reminding thcm of the Oracle' (i. e., their answer to the Athenians when they visited them at the bidding of the oracle). Herodotus has obviously misplaced the whole Störy just as his account of the mission of Alexander after the battle of Salamis ought to have been inserted before the battle if the sequence of events is to be understood: the 'carrying out of apparently impossible conditions', though a universal type of folk-story, is nevertheless applicable much more to the occasion of the expedition of Miltiades to Lemnos than to the legendary mission of the Pelasgians to Athens.
After his return to the Chersonese, Miltiades was still dogged by the family misfortune. As far as we can gather from the very confused 1) Mitchell and Caspari's edition of Grote, page 159, note 2.
2) The earliness of the date is implied by Herodotus when he says that 'ueither Athenians nor any other Greeks at that time owned slaves '. (vi. 137.) 3 and uncertain text of Herodotus'), he arrived in the first instance (after his first visit to Leumos) at the Chersonese in 513. In 510 he is expelled by an inroad of Scythians-and perhaps this is the occasion of his second visit of annexation to Lemnos. In 496, however, he returned to the Chersonese and remained there for three years tili he was again expelled in 493. Thus between 510 and 496 he was in exile somewhere, bat where he was and what he was doing neither Herodotus nor Nepos can teil ns.
The Story of his life is taken up by the latter in 490 or 491, and wo hear nothing of the trial which Herodotus mentions he had to undergo at the hands of his syß-Qoi. -What the trial was for and who precisely these iyß-Qoi were is not at all clear. It could not have been the Alcmaeonidae who were the Ixf^-Qoi^), say Messrs. Mitchell and Caspari in their edition of Grote, for they were partisans of the ex-tyrant Hippias. They suggest that it was an attempt to disqualify Miltiades for the generalship by an dytoöoxiixaaia.
But he was accused immediately on his return from the Chersonese in 493 and he stood for the generalship in 490: the Alcmaeonidae, moreover, could no doubt waive their scruples at times, and this accusation may have been the precedent for the subsequent accusation by Xanthippus after-the Parian debacle. They were further becoming unpopulär, and the removal of Miltiades would be of inestimable service to their cause: perhaps they united, according to the best traditions of the Athenian three-party system, with the democracy of the rising Theraistocles, to get the common enemy removed. But whatever was the cause of this attack, Miltiades appears to have gained increased popularity, and in the year of Marathon he is elected as C)Xi>axr)yÖQ.
From this point Cornelius Nepos and Herodotus give parallel accounts of the events leading up to Marathon and the Parian expedition.
On the approach of the Persians after the collapse of the defences at Artemisium, Herodotus says that ([Hhjtjtidrjq the /jfisQÖÖQOfiog is sent to Sparta "while the Athenians still remain in their city". Nepos states the bare fact, but caUs the runner Phidippus, and emphasises the point that he was a runner eins generis qai hemerodromoe vocantur. There now took place, according to Nepos, the dispute among the generals as to what plan of action tö adopt: the dispute is described and Miltiades' arguments given. Herodotus rather unaccountably attributes the whole affair to the time when the Athenians were ready for battle, a time when such a dispute would be both unlikely and undesirable: it was after the arrival of the Plataeans, he says, that lyivovro Siya ai ypSfiai.
In the Speech of Miltiades reported by Herodotus he is made to say that victory at Marathon would be as great as the act of freedom of 1) Herodotus vi. 40. -2) p. 146, note 1.
Jlarmoclius and Aristogeiton; perliaps we have here a Further eine as to tlie eninity of tho Poisistraticlac, who were as antagouistic to tlie earlior mcmbers of the Philaid famüy as were tlie Alcmaeonidae to the later: for the reference to the tyrannicides would hardly seem apposite unless tlieir mcmory was cherished by Miltiades.
The arrival of the Plataeans raises the probleni of the exact numbers of tho Greek army.
Nepos says that the total was 10,000 iiichiding the Plataeans-horuvi adventu decein niilia armatornm completa sunt. Pausanias and Plutarch give the same numbers, but Justin makes it 11,000, giving 10,000 Athenians 1000 Plataeans. Nepos seems here undoubtedly to follow the better tradition, howeyer preferable it raay be from the melodramatic point of view to time their arrival at a critical momeiit.
His account is still further strengthened by topographical arguments, for there is no direct communication between Plataea and Marathon. The road from Plataea to Athens is straightforward enough, but the only way to reach Marathon without first going to Athens would be by going first to Thebes and thence to Eleon and Oropus and across the spurs of Mt. Parnes to Aphidna and so to the northern end of the piain of Marathon, and this would be a considerably longer march and a much more difficult road than if they went direct to Athens and then on to Marathon by the coast route. Of course Herodotus may have meant that the Plataeans went to Athens and, finding that Miltiades had already set out, followed him later: but he does not say that they went to Athens, and it seems highly probable that he thought that they came direct from Plataea to Marathon.
The most striking divergencies between the two accounts, however, appear in the subsequent narrative of the actual fight. The Greeks, says Herodotus, were sp zt/xtpsc 'ifyayMoc. Now this ztfitvog is usually thought to be half-way up the mountain side in the valley of Avlona, where tradition and probability alike would place it. It was from this eminence, about a mile from the Persian camp according to traditional accounts, that the Greek forces descended at the double, gaining impetus as they went-dgoficp hvxo sg rovc ßaQßaQovg-says Herodotus.
But Nepos gives an entirely different version. After their departure from Athens the Greeks go straight and camp loco idoneo.
Then without the delay of several days which Herodotus states took place (probably in Order that he could find time for his mis-timed debate of the generals) postero die suh montis radicihus acic rcrjionc imtnicta nova arte^) vi summa proelium comisenint.
In this sentence no less than three new pieces of evideuce appear.
The first is the immediate action of the Greeks without the delay postulated by tlic confusod chronology of Herodotus"^).
The second is that, whether their camp was on the level or on the hill, they begau the battle not from the slopes as Herodotns implies, biit from the foot of the mountains on the piain. Now whichever liistorian niay seom on thc whole to be more reliable, it appears fairly obvious that Nepos gives at least a coherent account of the battle, implying that it was skilfully conducted and a triuinph of tactics. All we learn from Herodotus is that it was a wild foiiorn hope of men inspired with almost supernatural courage. On the face of it, Cornelius Nepos is preferable, and he at least would have no purpose to serve by elaborating the Herodoteau version and improving it with touches of military realism. Herodotus, on the other hand, as will bo subsequently discussed, drew from sources which were bitterly antagonistic to Miltiades and Philaid traditions, and which would go to no little trouble to deprive Miltiades even of the semblance of military ability. The whole account of Nepos, in fact, gives an absolutely different version of the battle. Four very important points are emphasised: points which completely alter the traditional conception of the battle. Firstly, there is the assertion that the piain of Marathon near the Greek camp was covered with trees scattered here and there fairly frequently; in the secoiul place the mountain at the rear of the Greeks was of some Strategie advantage; thirdly, this first fact-namely, the occurence of trees on the piain-was made use of to hinder the movements of the enemy's cavalry; fourthly, the mere mention pf cavalry goes far to disposc of many difficulties which had been brought about by their absence in the Herodotean Version.
In regard to the first point, it is generally believed that the piain of Marathon has been from time immemorial not only treeless but actually a marsh in some places. Thus Grote, quoting Finlay, says, 'the uninterrupted flatness of the piain is hardly relieved by a Single tree'Now however true this is to-day we need definite proof of the assertion that it was equally true in 490 B. C. before we can dispute the veiy uncompromising statement of Nepos. And not only is the proof for such a dogmatic statement as Grote's not to be found, but there is every likelihood that in the Century B.C. the opposite was the case; for it has been shown^) that-Greece has suffered from a steady loss of Vegetation: its surface is becoming eveiy day less covered with trees, and evidence is now forthcoming of the greater prevalence of forest zones in earher times-particularly in northern Greece. But as a matter of fact all that Cornelius Nepos says is that the piain was covered with 'trees at intervals', and this is a description that applies admirably to the typical Greek 'scrubland' or_ 'bush'. 1) IV p. 274.
2) Zimmern, The Crreek Commonwealth p. 41. Eveu in the last thirty years the area of forest land is said to have been reduced by one half. Cf. Myres, Greek Lands and Greek People.
NO\Y the Statement about tlie strategical valne of the mountain is curious and rather difficnlt to understand. Presumably the ineaniiig of ut montiiun tcgerentur altitudine is that the mountain prevented them from being onfiladed or cut off in the rear, for if they were drawn up suh niontis radieibus it woukl be almost impossible to surprise them in the rear or flank. Bot the safety of this position would apparently only apply as long as they remainecl there, for as soon as they left the radices montium they would obviously be unguarded on both rear and flank.
But by far the most illuminating evidence is the Statement that the Greeks dehberately took up a position where they could make the most of the natural features in order to avoid the dangers of hostile cavalry^);
it implies not only that Mütiades was a thoroughly capable tactician, but also that the Persian cavalry, at least at the commencement of the fight, was a force to be reckoned with.
The actual topography of the piain of Marathon at the present day fully bears out these arguments and verifies the account of Nepos-). The
Valley of Avlona is bounded on the south by Mt. Agrieliki and Mt. Aphorismos, and on the north by Mt. Kotroni. All these three mountains are wooded and the two mountains on the south side are covered with what is, for all practical purposes, a forest which reaches right down to the level piain. The actual piain is for the most part cultivated, and so denuded of trees, but in the few places where it is not cultivated there are several large trees, and it seems quite possible that in ancient tinies th,e whole of the western end of the valley was well wooded. It seems certain too that there were trees at fairly frequent intervals still further down the valley and well on to the main part of the piain, for the whole of the southern part of the plains along the coast towards the site of the ancient Probahnthus is covered with trees right down to tlie shore.
The only part of the piain that was undoubtedly not wooded in ancient times is the part in the immediate neighbourhood of the Soros, between the Great and the Little Marshes. Now Herodotus, after asserting that Marathon was IjcitridbLÖrcaov ymQLov ri/g 'AttixF^q bvtjtjzevoac nevertheless makes no further mention of the Persian cavalry at all: it has consequently been assumecl that it never even landed from the Persian transports but was conveyed round to Phalerum as soon as the shield signal was given from Athens. But 1) Arborum tractu means that they soattered tree trunka and branclies Over the open spaces: they would hardly be likely to do this unless there were trees available on the spot.
3) I am indebted to Professor Lehmann-Haupt for tlie snggestion that the topography of Marathon supports the accout of Nepos, and I have since been able to verify it in detail myself.
this stateraeut of Nepos shows tluit the cavaliy mnst at least have been landed, ov the Greeks would hardly have taken such elaborate precautions. The Statement that the coiintry was dotted with trees seems directly opposed to that which makes it fcjrtr^rfstorßTor b'ijtjTSvaai. But perhaps a way out of the whoie difficulty may he foiind by assuming from the ovidence of the natnre of the actual site that the piain of Marathon near the sea was admirably suited for cavalry action, and that the Greeks, seeing this, remained in their safe position (which commandod llie coast road to Athens and so was adequate to prevent Persian advance) nntil tlie Persians re-embarked their cavalry and sent it round to Phalernni. Then it was that they descended d{)/>iirp upon the Persians. Now tho unsupported evidence of Cornelius Ncpos for this conipletely different view of the outlines of the battle of Marathon is not likely to be accepted without some hesitation. But when in addition to tiie Support of topographical ovidence the narrative of Herodotus iniplicitly, and perhaps nnconsciously, agrees with it, its triith is rendered niucli niore likely, however little value we attach to the version of Herodotus. Such iniplicit agreeniont is found in the text: for Herodotus says that tlie Greeks pressed on 'at the double', ol'rt 'i-rjrof vjrc:()y/>t'fj/i^ o<fi dvTt To^erfiärror^). Certainly no authority assorts that thore was any Greek force of cavalry, and it seenis redundant to reniark on the alisence of it; but considering' that Nepos had declared that the natiire of the land was unsuited to cavalry and that the Greeks had taken advantago üf this fact, the reniark of Herodotus acquires a new sigiiificance. By itself it seenis superfluous to say that the Greeks had not got either horseinen or archers: there were innuraerable things that tliey had not got as well. But Herodotus has got such an inveterate habit of inserting incidental and omitting essential points that it niay well seera that he stated a fact and forgot to mention the reasons for it: the fact being the absence of cavalry and archers, the reason, as Nepos says, being the incapacity to use them-which would apply a fortiori to the Greeks if they assumed it in regard to the enemy.
Undoubtedly the Persian cavalry was reembarked not so niuch for its supposed utility on the plains of Phalernm but because of the discovery of the deceptive nature of the place which had been specially selected for its nianoeuvres. There is no necessity to represent the plans of the 1) It seems hard to understand tho absence nf ai'chers, considering tlie discoveries of large nnmbers ot' Greok bronze arrowheatls on the field. 8oe Hauvetto in Noufellcs Airhires des Mkaiona Hcimlißqnex vol. IT p.
•'520-38.5. Tliey miglit possibly liave belonged to the Greeks of Karysturi, wbo were pressed into the Persian Service (ch. 90).
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Persians as over-elaborate: they miglit well liavo been mistaken in some of their assumptions.
The fact tliat the cavalry ultimately reembarked seems proved by and they coiüd hardly have done this if the Persian cavalry had boen on the foreshore so eminently suited to their tactics.
The problem of the cavalry at Marathon is not solved by assnming that they were never intended to be landed at all, but were destined for Phalernm and were to start as soon as the Athenian forces were lured out of their city: there still remains this very definite assertion of Herodotus that they were especially brought to Marathon because it was so suited to their tactics. Herodotus, it is true, makes no further mention of theni. But Nepos definitely assumes their presence. Suidas gives the Story that the lonians in the Persian fleet made a signal to the Athenians to the effect that "the horses are gone". According to Pausanias the field of Marathon in bis time was said to be liaunted by the noise of corabatants and the snorting of horses: so that there is considerable authority for the presence of cavalry at some time during the battle. They were undoubtedly absent at the end and at the height of the battle as well, but there seems every probability that they were landed just before the battle but re-embarked as soon as they realised the unsuitability of the place. It was this re-embarkation that was signalled by the lonians, and it was not necessarily due in the first instance to any prearranged plan to coiivey them to Phalerum: they may ultimately have gone there, but they were intended for use at Marathon. In appears, therefore, that the cavalry upon which .the Persians had decided to place most rehance turned out to be useless either for defence or offence. The piain was no doubt ijnxrjötLorarnv tPiJijTSvCjcu in some places, but it was certainly not so in the particular place where the Persians found they would have to fight if they were to pass the Atlienians and get to Athens. In fact, they had made a grave -strategical error, despite the advice which Hippias, froni his experience of the locality, might have been supposed to give them.
in their account of the Parian expedition, however, Herodotus and Cornehus Nepos show most clearly both the nature of the sources they drew from and their respective prepossessions and prejudices.
Both historians agree that the expedition consisted of seventy ships and that it set out from Athens. After this, however, the two versions Miltiades theveby assunied the whole responsibihty for the iindertaking: it was, in short, his idea and diie to bis initiative, or rather his arrogance as Herodotus makes it out to be.
In other words, Miltiades and the Parian expedition are delineated in goose chase for an unexplained reason we have a definite policy of detence: Milfciades is given a commission-an imperiiim exactiy the same as that of Pompey or Antonius in later days-ut insulas quae harharns adiuverant hello persequei-ehtr.
Perhaps this is too much in the spirit of Athens during the critical time of the secession of raembers from the Delian league, but there is no other reason against it. Herodotus at any rate agrees on one point with Nepos, for he declares tliat MiUiades went to Paros (no other of the Cyclades is mentioned) irQiUpaöLv TYMV cog NI UCCQIOI vjrrjQ^AR TTQorsQOL (jT(;ßTfrO|M£j'Oi TQifjQEOi tc j)faQUi}(örtt afta reo UkQGi]-a reason which might well represent a policy instead of a personal spite. But Herodotus hastens to dispel any such idea concerning his narrative by adding that rorro /(hv rf/} jtQÖöyjjiia loymr rjv, and proceeding to explain how it was all due to a private grudge that Miltiades held for the Parians because a certain Lysagoras son of Teisias had spread scandal about him to Mydarnes the Persian -a truly reasonable excuse for such an enterprise! The expedition, however, seems to have been partially successful.
Pleras ad officium redire coegit, nonnullas vi expugnavit,
says Nepos: that is to say the formation of a ring of defensive bases was not only the intention but also the result of the expedition.
Herodotus represents him as going immediately to Paros. Nepos inore reasonably includes Paros aniong other visitations: ex Iiis Purum inSLilam, opHiis elatam, cum oratione reconciliare nnn possei, copias e navihus eduxit, and not only entirely ignores the 'private grudge' story, but says that Paros was opihtis elatam. and arrogant-the usual prelude to subjugation.
The siege then began, and, says Herodotus, a inessenger was sent by Miltiades to the Parians, demanding a hundred talents. Nepos makcs no mention of this demand, but it obviously falls into line with his statenient that the Island was opihus elata, though Herodotus uses it rather to depreciate Miltiades and show him in the light of a bandit.
The siege, however, was not destined to be a success, and it was abruptly brought to a dose. The two rival versions, however, differ in such an extraordinaiy way on this point that we are driven to the deepest scepticism in regard to our kuowledge of Greek history which depends on such variable sources.
Herodotus relates that Miltiades owing to the failure of the siege and his despair of ever taking the city, commenced negotiations for its betrayal with the priestess Timo. Then follows the well-known story of his sacrilege in the precincts of Demeter -f'/re XAVJAOVRÄ TL XC'JV A-MVIIROW tiVe o xi ö/j xoVf jTQtjiorru-(a charge the veiy vagueness of which seems to make it seem more serious), and then his accident and abandonment of the siege. Now Nepos gives the following account of the crisis in the siege. So far from the siege being a failure, he says that Miltiades was 'just on the point of taking Faros': but that one night a forest on the island suddenly for some unknown reason caught fire: both the besiegers and the besieged instantly jumped to the conchision that it was the Persians come to the help of the Parians, and that the fire was the Persian signal to the besieged. Miltiades therefore burnt his engines of siege and fled in a panic. Now the sensational element in each narrative seeras to be unduly emphasised and each differs so entirely from the other that there is no question of their being rival interpretations of the same stoiy. They have no Single element in common, except, perhaps, the suddenness of the abandonment of the siege.
But though it seems hard to adhere to either yersion, yet Cornelius Nepos seems in some respects to give the more reliable story. Thus Herodotus, while he states that the siege was a failure, yet gives no reason for its sudden abandonment. His story of the negotiations with Timo is a mere interpolation: it neither explains the alleged failure, nor yet the sudden abandonment: it is, in short, but a scandalous stoiy about a man whom Herodotus had been briefed to depreciate.
Nepos, however extravagant he may seem, yet gives a perfectly logical account. The siege was going on perfectly successfully-cum iam in eo esset ut oppido potiretur-hnt a sudden catastrophe sent Miltiades flying headlong back to Athens: the fhght, moreover, was caused through a fear of precisely those enemies whom Miltiades was sent to oppose, and so perhaps the sensational nature of the story can be minimised, considering the immense number of parallel instances of panics at night time both in ancient and modern warfare. In any case it is coherent and consistent, while the version of Herodotus is neither the one nor the other, for it leaves much that is unexplained and postulates much that is unnecessary.
As one might expect, on his sudden return to Athens, whence he had set forth with such an important commission, Miltiades arrived magna cum offensione civium suorum.
He had not only not redeemed his promise-whether it was XQW'^'^"-'Ad-rjvaioLg aysiv, or whether it was the formation of the Second Line of defence-but in addition he had wasted time and money in a worthless and fruitless venture of twenty-six days' duration.
At this point Herodotus attempts to remould his version by continuing the story of Timo, the priestess. The Parians, he says, sent d-sojtQojioi to Delphi to ask for advice as to her conduct. The oracle replied that it was no fault of the priestess, but the working of the fate of Miltiades. However this may be, it has little bearing on the outhnes of the story. proditio. Secondly, Nepos adds a further Charge of corruption. Thirdly, the incidental references to the Persian King and to Miltiades' abandonment of an otherwise successful siege are both consistent with the reason for and the progress of the expedition as previously narrated. Now ditäxrj is just the vagnie sort of reason that Herodotus usually gives for political trials such as this. Proditio-no doubt a species of djrdrrj-is, on the other hand, much more likely if the reason for the expedition was an anti-Persian plan of action.
Miltiades, however, feil ill-from the wound received on the occasion of his sacrilege, according to Herodotus: according to Nepos, from wounds received during the siege-eo tempore aeger erat vulneribus, quae in oppugnando oppido ceperat. He was unable therefore to conduct his own case and left it to his cpiZa-(Nepos says to Stesagoras or to a certain Dagoras, according to the reading: but Stesagoras had been assassinated years before, so it may have been another member of the family of that name).
He was accused chiefly by Xanthippus the son of Ariphron, says Herodotus, who demanded a death sentence. Nepos is silent on this point. In any case, however, the part played by the Alcmaeonidae in this trial may well have been played in the previous trial of 493, and both are palpably political coups: the power of the Alcmaeonidae had been considerably lessened by the growing popularity of the Philaidae, and this was an admirable opportunity for recovering their lost prestige.
Miltiades was condemned, but not on the capital Charge, and he was fined fifty talents-a sum which was xatd rrjv döiy.irjv according to Herodotus-or quantus in classem samptus factus erat according to the more exact Statement of Nepos.
He was, however, unable to pay the fine and in vinela publica coniectus est. Herodotus makes no mention of this latter fact, but it is given by Diodorus^) and Plutarch^). In prison, however, diem obiit 1) frag. lib. X. -2) Kimon 4 and ArisUchs 26.
U sif^rewitm,-because of bis woimds-(jcpaxehadvroc rov firjQov, says Herodotus.
No criticism of the trial at all appears in Herodotus: but Nepos particulaiiy distinguishes between the nominal Charge and the real underlying motive of the trial.
The latter, the alia causa damnationis was the Athenian fear of tyranny after their experience of Peisistratus-nimiam^) civium suorum •potentiam extimescehant. Now this is identical with the reason given by Herodotus for bis trial of 493 when the sxi)-Qol of Miltiades MimS,av rvQavj'idog. There is no reason, it is true, why the same cause should not have acted in each ease, but the two trials are not free froni suspicion of being confused by one or both of our authors. Now the comparison of the two versions of the events during the period of early Persian aggression has raised many problems for historians." We are faced first of all with the great problem of the sources of the history of the times of the Persian aggression. What evidence was available to contemporary historians, and how did they make use of it? and what accounts for the difference in so many essential points between the accounts of Nepos and Herodotus?
Even a cursory examination of the Herodotean narrative of the period shows that he used Alcaemonid sources for the greater part of the incidents he describes and particularly for the battle of Marathon. Whatever the other sources were that he used it is fairly certain that they were neither those of the house of the Peisistratidae nor those of the Philaidae. In particular his apologia for the action of the Alcmaeonidae at Marathon seems too obviously inspired to be spontaneous.
The whole narrative of Nepos, hoAvever, always omits just those points which can be conclusively held to be due to such inspiratioii. And not only is there this absence of Alcmaeonid traditions but there are definite and positive traces of some other traditions. What these traditions are remains to be seen. Lastly there is without doubt a certain amount of influence from subsequent history reflected in his narrative: the later fifth Century and its ideals seem to be mainly represented. But a scrutiny of the evidence alone can throw hght on these somewhat intangible points.
The chief points in the narrative of Herodotus which seem to be derived from Alcmaeonid traditions are the following:-In his account of the battle of Marathon the incident of the raising of the shield is mentioned as a Charge laid at the doors of the Alcmaeonidae only to be hastily condemned: but the Impression that it leaves 1) Or omniiim.
6* 15 is markedly one of 'qid s'excuse, s'accuse\
The reference to Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the speech of Miltiades at least rules out any Peisistratid traditions.
In the account of the Parian expedition we find first of all the explanation of the djcäxT] by which Miltiades coaxed Athens to lend him an armed force to use for his own private purposes. Then there is the definite assertion that the reason given by Miltiades for his attack on Paros was a mere pretext-a jtQÖGxVf'a loyov-his real reason being a personal quarrel with the Parian Lysagoras.
The demand for money and the negotiations with Timo, above all, are due to traditions of a very anti-Phüaid nature: and the attribution of the wound which caused his death to the occasion of the sacrilege seems an almost unnecessary piece of spite.
The definite Statement that Xanthippus undertook the conduct of the impeachment Coming on top of all this evidence seems to point to the common Alcmaeonid origin of all the stories-though, as has been suggested^), the story of Paros may be derived actually from Paros itself. Now not one of these 'Alcmaeonid' incidents is mentioned by Nepos, and nevertheless he gives a more coherent and corivincing account without showing traces of any suppression or omission in the narrative. But he goes further and teils many things about Miltiades which not only redound to his credit but throw an entirely different hght on the course of events. These can be summarised as follows.
The Lemnian Expedition was the occasion for the first demonstration of what might be called the 'Cycladic pohcy', and Miltiades, like his son in later days, seems to have had a commission to strengthen the defences of the Islands against the Persians.
At Marathon the whole plan of the battle according to Nepos shows Miltiades in the light of a capable general and the battle as a tactical victory rather than a forlorn hope. The timing of tlie discussion of the generals and the arrival of the Plataeans before the departure from Athens, the nature of the site chosen for the camp, and the tactical use made of the natural features-particularly the trees and mountains-all point in the same direction.
But the account of the Parian expedition is a still greater vindication of Miltiades.
Not only are none of the 'Alcmaeonid' points mentioned, but we learn that in this case too Miltiades showed throughout an eminently laudable statesmanship. He set out with a commission-an impermm-to clear the seas of Persian influences: this he did by subduing many Islands, amongst which was Paros: and he was within an ace of subduing Faros when an accident caused in his ranks a panic such as has overtaken many of the most experienced generals. He was fined not for djidTTj but for proditio, and being unable to pay was imprisoned and died in prison of wounds honourably gained: whereas in Herodotus the scandal of Timo pursues him right to his grave. Now Cornelius Nepos is supported in many of these points by the historian Ephorus.
Thus the assertion that Miltiades was imprisoned is repeated by Diodorus and Phitarch, who both drew largely froin Ephorus. The account of the sudden abandonment of the siege of Faros and the forest fire which was mistaken for a Fersian onslaught is given verhatim in Ephorus^), though it is located by him at Myconos, while Nepos says it was on Faros itself and does not mention that the Greeks thought that it was caused by the forces of Datis, as Epfiorus does.
It seems, therefore, highly probable that Nepos derived much from Ephorus. But this Solution only pushes the problem further back, and we have still to ask whether Ephorus derived his Information from Alcmaeonid, from Feisistratid or from Fhilaid traditions. This, unfortunately, is a problem which we cannot easily solve with so scant a knowledge of Ephorus at our command.
But in regard to Nepos, we can definitely rule out the Alcmaeonid sources and trace most of his narrative unreservedly to his knowledge of the traditions of the Fhilaid house. His favourable and apparently accurate account of the events in the life of Miltiades is sufficient evidence by itself to prove this-quite apart from the 'authentic' character of nearly all his narrative.
An independent piece of evidence for the existence in the time of Cornelius Nepos of sources for this period of Greek history which were not solely Alcmaeonid in character is seen in the isolated fact given by Cicero 2), that Hippias died at Marathon. Herodotus does not mention it, curiously enough, although his Alcmaeonid informants would have no particular desire to screen the Feisistratidae. It is not given by Nepos, and the only other author to mention it is Justin®), who probably derived it from Cicero. Ferhaps Cicero derived it from Ephorus: but the only inference we are really justified in drawing is that in the time of Cornelius Nepos there were available certain sources for Greek History that were tinged neither by Alcmaeonid nor Feisistratid preferences Whether they were Fhilaid sources it seems impossible to say, but there seems every probability that it was from such that Cornelius Nepos drew to a very 1) FHa n. 107. -2) Ep. ad Att. IX, 10. -3) II, 9. 4) If the reading Dionysii is adopted in place o£ Dinonis in another passage (see Gaisford: Saidas, p. 1018, note M), Cicero appears to have known the works o£ Dionysius of Miletus.
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large extent. It is not therefore unreasonable to attribute to them this isolated fact about Hippias as well.
But to identify such sources firstly with Ephorus and then with Philaid traditions is merely to make them a little less vague. To solve the difficulty it is necessary to search for a still more definite source, for Philaid traditions must have been collected in a form in which they were easy for Hstorians like Ephorus or Nepos to draw upon. Now since the sources used by Herodotus are for the most part Alcmaeonid, they are a priori therefore of a pro-Athenian and anti-Ionian nature: and this is borne out by facts, for it is notoriously the aim of Herodotus to shew Athens as the Saviour of Greece, and to achieve this end he suppresses all suggestion of Medism at Athens or ill-treatment of lonians. The punishment of Phrynichus for his lonic patriotism is but one of the many anti-Ionic actions of the Alcmaeonids which escaped his censorship, and we can be sure that there were many more which did not escape.
If therefore the account of Nepos brings out precisely those points which Herodotus either passed over in haste or eise suppressed altogether, it stands to reason that the sources of that account must be both lonian and anti-Alcmaeonid, and, in a sense, anti-Athenian. Now the historiau who dealt with the history of the Persian Wars in precisely this spirit was Dionysius of Miletus. He wrote his nsQötxd (Idöi dtßlfxroj)') purely from the lonian point of view. "This lonian Logos of the Persian War was, we may conjecture, a challenge to unreserved admirers of Athens", says Prof. Bury^). As such, it would naturally bring out in füll detail such points as are brought out in the narrative of Nepos, and omitted in that of Herodotus.
Herodotus, as has already been pointed out''), undoubtedly drew to a considerable extent froih Dionysius of Miletus, particularly in certain points, but only in the case of the facts of less importance and less open to dispute"^). This is, of course, additional eyidence to prove that an lonian history of the Persian Wars was both available and well-known. Now just as Herodotus drew on Alcmaeonid sources for his history, so we can conjecture did Dionysius' of Miletus draw upon Philaid sources. Herodotus, in all probability, wrote his history at Athens, where, presumably, oral Alcmaeonid Information and memoirs would be available. If it is Seen that Philaid traditions and memoirs were available at Miletus then the probability that Dionysius drew upon them is considerably strengthened. 1) Suidas, V. under Dionysius. -2) Greek Historians, p. 22. 3) Lehmann-Haupt in Elio, 1902, p. 334 et seq. 4) As for instance in tlie case of the advice of Hecataeus, the names of Cyprian potentates, etc. Prof. Lehmann-Haupt deals most thoroughly with all these points, That this was so is for all practical purposes a mere conjecture, but it is strengthened by the facts that the Philaid stronghold of the Chersonese is within easy reach of Miletns either by sea er by way of Sigeium, and that Lemnos was equally accessible. Mr. Gnindy^) asserts of Herodotus that his lack of information about Miltiades from the time of the Scythian expedition to that of the lonian revolt was due to his lack of documentary evidence. "Had the historian made large use of private memoirs," he says, "supposing such existed, it is unlikely that he would have omitted to have recourse to the records of the Philaid family". But the assumption that if he had access to memoirs of one family he would ipso facto have had access to those of another is directly contrary to Greek historical method, and is in no way justified: moreover, it is a certainty that Herodotus had free use of Alcmaeonid memoirs and that would of itself prevent him from making uiuch use of Philaid memoirs if his history was to be in any way coherent.
Dionysius of Miletus, however, had little or no chance of using Alcmaeonid memoirs, and he certainly had no reason to do so if his history was to be written in the lonian spirit as well as in the "lonian dialect": whereas he had ample opportunity and füll justification for using memoirs and traditions of the Philaidae, which, we may not without reason assume, were to be obtained through the medium of men like Aristagoras who were personally acquainted with Miltiades the younger. Moreover, it is safe to assume that Miltiades was not only well-known but also populär at Miletus, for it is he whom Herodotus sets up as the protagonist in the dispute with Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, and being represented as the would-be hberator of the Milesians, it is hard to imagine that he and his history would be ignored by a writer of lonian history. There is, therefore, not only a very strong a priori case for the use by Dionysius of Philaid traditions and memoirs, but also considerable evidence to show that he actually did so: and since the source of the account given by Nepos of the Persian Wars seems to echo Philaid traditions more than any others it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he drew largely from the ÜEQaixa of Dionysius, either directly or indirectly through the medium of some writer such as Ephorus. That he used a Greek historian is certain, judging by the large number of Graecisms in his vocabulary^).
There is one point, however, in which the narrative of Cornelius Nepos may well be questioned. As was mentioned above, his account of the Lemnian and Parian expeditions presupposes a very extensive policy of combined offence and defence against the Persians. In each case Miltiades was commissioned by the Athenian people to strengthen Athenian 1) The Qreat Persian War p. 146, note. 2) Cf. Macan: Appendix I, paragr. 14.
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power in the Cyclades. Now, as Messrs. Mitchell and Caspari suggest, all this seems to be too much in the vein of the later fifth Century and too reminiscent firstly of the purpose and formation of the Delian leagiie and secondly of the suppression of its revolted members: for a city or Island to be opihiis elata^ as Nepos says of Faros, was always the prelude to its revolt from Athens.
The forest fire on Faros which Ephorus and Nepos alike describe, and which was the immediate cause of the retreat of Miltiades, reminds one rather forcibly of the similar fire on the island of Sphakteria in 425, So that Nepos is not quite free from the suspicion of interpreting earlier history by later, just as the fourth Century orators described Solonian Athens in terms of the Athens of their own age.
But it is much more likely that the resemblances are mere coincidence, and Nepos may, after all, be giving the most valuable historical evidence. And this suggests that a revision of the traditional account of the history of this period is necessary. A 'Cycladic policy' as early as the time of the Lemnian expedition is a fact which might well have been one of the preliminaries to the lonian revolt, and it might equally well have been a further reason for the expeditions of Mardonius and of Datis and Artaphernes. Frobability is still more in favour of a renewal of the policy after Marathon as the Greeks were never that happy-go-lucky nation that Herodotus would make them out to be: there was a least a method in their madness.
An establishment of a strong base on Lemnos would be the least that Athens could do either before or after the lonian revolt. At any rate somewhere about the time 513-510 B. C. Miltiades was engaged in estabhshing Athenian power in the North East Aegean. Feisistratus before him had already paved the way by establishing friendly relations with the people of the district round Fangaeum^), which, though primarily for his own advantage, would nevertheless be to the advantage of Athens when he was restored, and an Athenian outpost had been established at a still earlier date at Sigeium, and was itself in friendly communication with Froconnesus
Lemnos would be of the utmost Strategie importance if any check was to be put upon Fersian ambition, for it lay within reach of the two outposts of Sigeium and Fangaeum, and could thus establish communication between the two. The Thracian Chersonese would probably have been a still better base, and undoubtedly Miltiades' mission thither serVed the double purpose of exiling him and strengthening the outer llne of Athenian defence: but it was too difficult a place for him to hold and he had to fall back on Lemnos. The coincidence in time, however, of the two Visits of Mütiades to Lemnos and the Scythian 1) 'Ad-rivaL(i)v TIoXitEia oh. XV.
2) Cf. the famoua Sigeium inscription: Hicks and Hill, Greek Inscriptions, no. 8. expedition of Darius is, perhaps, the strengest reason for attributing to those Visits a political purpose and identifying them with the first active results of Athenian 'Cycladic Policy'. Athens not only feared Persia, but was stirred by that fear to take precautions of a rery practical nature against the growing menace. The rapidity of subsequent events and their great importance and interest tend to obscure the fact that Athens was not only strong enough but was also wise enough to act in a very definite and effective way. The attempt of the Phoenician squadron of the Persian fleet to capture Miitiades is ample proof that Persia realised the schemes of Athens.
The detailed account of the strategy of Marathon is a fact which points in the same direction-namely, towards a representation of the Greeks as deliberately arranging a plan of action for the battle, just as they deliberately originated a general poHcy. All the battles in the Persian Wars are, if we believe Herodotus, brilliant examples of heroism and poor ones of strategy. But it is difficult even in the case of his description of a battle such as Plataea to deny the Greeks any capacity for strategy. The account of Marathon, therefore, given by Nepos seems to act as a corrective to Herodotus. At any rate, neither can claim to be derived from superior sources, and if Herodotus has the weight of tradition behind him the narrative of Nepos at least derives considerable force from its plausibility. It is, further, of no little importance that the account of the battle given by Nepos agrees in detail with the nature of the locality. From Nepos we gather that the Greek camp was on a level wooded place at the foot of the mountains which Surround the valley of Avlona. Herodotus, it is true, says that the Greeks were ev rtfisvei 'flQaxXeoi; and the remains of such a rtfisvoq are te be found on the slopes of Mt. Kotroni. But Herodotus may only have meant near the rtixsvog as it is in any case not large enough for 10,000 men. The most likely Site for the camp seems to be on a level platform at the foot of the rinBvoq and on the opposite slopes of Aphorismos where there is now a small shepherds' hamlet, and there is every likelihood that this level platform was originally defended on all sides by trees such as now appear in the neighbourhood on the piain and on the slopes of Agrioliki and Aphorismos. It seems hardly hkely that the camp was on the spur to the north of the modern village of Vrana, for it is altogether too small and tofl steep either to accommodate such a large body of men or to agree with the description given by Nepos.
Unfortunately, a middle course between the two accounts cannot be arrived at, for, so far from being mutuaUy supplementary, they are directly at variance on so many points. The site of the camp, for instance, the attack of the Greeks and the problem of the cavalry are aU 21 instances in which the accounts cannot be reconcüed. But on the whole Nepos seems to give the preferable version both of the two Cycladic expeditions and of Marathon, although in many points he too is untrustworthy.
The comparison, therefore, of all the evidence of Nepos with that of Herodotus for the accounts of the Lemnian Expedition, the battle of Marathon and the Parian expedition show that throughont Herodotus is tempted by his prejudices and prepossessions to distort the history he relates. Alcmaeonid traditions and memoirs had got too strong a hold of his imagination to permit him to give an impartial account. Philaid traditions, which would obviously be the best to use for these particular events, he seems to have been either unable or unwilling to use. Dionysius of Miletus, on the other hand, seems to have had free access at Miletus to the memoirs of the family of Miltiades, and it seems to have been from his works that Nepos drew when writing his Vita Miltiadis. However partial to Miltiades such a history may have been, it must still have been more true to facts than the very partial and biassed accounts which the Alcmaeonidae would have given to Herodotus. The generalship and genius of Miltiades which his prominence in Greek history implies and the early elaboration of a Cycladic policy which the subsequent course of histoiy seems to justify, are factors of the very highest importance in Greek history, of which, if we rehed solely upon Herodotus, we should remain in complete ignorance.
Athens.
